Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 3).pdf/280

 in the interest and at the instance of his brother, determined to hold the property so purchased at the sale until respondent secured the account owing to his brother, when a bill of sale was to be made to respondent's wife. The buggy had not been purchased at the execution sale, but had been attached, and the attorney testifies that he suggested to Mr. Jones that it would be well to have Mr. Taylor turn that over also, and that Taylor consented so to do. Taylor says he simply made no reply. Several witnesses testify that Taylor did, in fact, turn the buggy over. Taylor as explicitly swears that he did not. The question was for the jury. Respondent’s testimony is all consistent with the theory that he did not turn the buggy over as a pledge or otherwise, and the fact that he is opposed by a number of witnesses does not render the verdict so entirely unsupported by evidence as to warrant a court in disturbing it. It may be true, as urged by learned counsel, that if respondent knew that appellant understood him to consent to turn over the property, or any portion of it, as a pledge, and if he knew that, relying upon such consent, appellant dismissed the attachment, and thus altered his condition to his prejudice, respondent would be estopped from denying his consent. The trouble in applying the proposition in this case is the fact that respondent swears he had no knowledge that appellant released the attachment. If that be true, there is no element of estoppel in the situation. We may add that respondent's statement has strong corroboration in the circumstances, as they seem to have been understood by the parties. If the horses and harness passed to David Jones by virtue of the purchase, and were to be held by him unless security was given for the account, then the attachment became a mere useless appendage, as the value of such property far exceeded the amount of the account, and it would be only natural that respondent should give no further thought to the attachment. There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to whether or not respondent consented that the horses and harness might be held even under the purchase. This discussion of the evidence demonstrates, we think, that the