Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 3).pdf/159

 a particular usage existed and was known to the parties to the contract, such usage may, and often docs, modify the contract. Sections 449, 456, Id. Blackstone makes the same distinction, and defines the two classes of customs as follows: ‘General customs, which are the universal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law in its strict and more usual signification; particular customs, which for the most part affect only the inhabitants of particular districts.” 1 Bl. Comm. 67. The books are replete with decisions illustrating and applying the general doctrine that special customs and the usages of trade may be shown by testimony produced in court for the purpose of modifying contracts. Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464; Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200. But, as we have seen, such customs as have ceased to be special i. e. local as to territory or limited as to classes, and have become generally known, used and understood by the people and taxpayers of the whole state, and of many other states, no longer need to be proved, because all courts and judges are bound to ‘know such matters of fact and such usages and customs as are so notorious as to be commonly known. This general proposition is elementary. Stev. Dig. Ev. 124, and notes. The matters judicially noticed are very numerous, and need not be enumerated here. It will suffice to say that all authorities agree that the vernacular language, and such ordinary abbreviations as are in common use, are noticed without proof. Reyn. Ev. 68. To prove facts commonly known is regarded by the courts as a waste of time, and for that reason is not permitted. Id. p. 66. While authority abounds showing that special customs may be established by testimony, we have searched laboriously, but in vain, for a precedent which authorizes the introduction of evidence to establish the existence of a custom of language which is alleged to be generally known and understood by the taxpayers and people throughout an entire state or nation. It is in our view, obviously unsound to argue that the courts or judges of a state or nation may be considered as unaware of the existence of a custom of language which