Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 3).pdf/141

 distinctly marked than it has become under the operation of more recent statutes. The existing practice of entering judgments without notice probably grew up under the statute in consonance with the theory that only ex parte matters, followed by orders made as of course, could be entertained by a judge when not sitting as a court. The section cited confers upon the “judges” as well as the courts, authority to direct the entry of judgment. We think this implies that the legislature intended judgments to be entered, except in cases where the statute otherwise specially directed, without notice or other formalities than the simple direction of the court, or of the judge at chambers. There seems to be no necessity for such notice ordinarily. None is expressly required in cases tried by the court. Section 5067, Comp. Laws. On the other hand a motion is expressly required by the terms of a recent statute regulating the entry of judgments based upon the reports of referees. Laws 1889, p. 151. Applications for judgment in default of answer is specially regulated by § 5025, Id.; and in cases of a frivolous demurrer, answer, or reply, § 5026 expressly requires notice of the application to be given. What we say in this case has no application to cases arising under those sections. In the cases mentioned in § 5095, we see no danger, and see some practical advantages likely to result from the practice of entering judgment without notice. No judgment can be regularly entered without an application therefor to the court or judge, and if deemed expedient, an order for notice and a hearing before rendering judgment can be made in any case. Counsel for defendant cite § 5333, Comp. Laws, which requires that, in cases where defendant has appeared in an action, notice of the ordinary proceedings in the action shall be served on defendant or his attorney. But this general provision must, under a familiar rule of construction, yield to any statute framed expressly to control a particular subject. There is a corresponding section in the practice act of the State of Minnesota. See volume 1, § 72, Ch. 66, Gen. St. Minn. 1878. In Leyde v. Martin, 16 Minn. 38, Gil. 24, where judgment was entered without notice