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 by the law as equally effective in transferring the title and possession from the vendor to the vendee with actual tradition. What the law requires, and all that the law requires, is that the conduct of the parties should clearly show a relinquishment of ownership and possession, and all rights of control on the part of the vendor, and an assumption of ownership and possession and control on the part of the vendee. We think these requirements were fully met by the conduct of the parties in this case, as shown by the undisputed testimony. There is not even a suspicion in the testimony that respondent's vendors, after delivery of the key of the warehouse to respondent's agent, ever exercised any control whatever, real or apparent, over the property. Nor is there any indication that there was aught about the warehouse that would lead any one to suppose that it was in the possession of such vendors, or that they were in any manner carrying on their business therein. Nor does any reason occur to us why this delivery should be defeated because a third party had property in the same warehouse, and held a key thereto. After the delivery of the key to the agent, respondent's vendors ceased to have access to the building or control of any property therein. Prior to that time they did have access to and actual possession of the property sold to respondent. By their acts they transferred all their right of access, and their possession, to respondent. The vendors’ rights and possession could not have been more completely terminated had they, therefore, been sole occupants of the building. We think the trial court rightly held as matter of law that the undisputed evidence showed an immediate delivery, and actual and continued change of possession, good as against existing creditors of the vendors. See, generally, Packard v. Dunsmore, 11 Cush. 282; Russell v. O'Brien, 127 Mass. 349; Vining v. Gilbreth, 39 Me. 496; McKee v. Garcelon, 60 Me. 165; Benford v. Schell, 55 Pa. St. 393.

What we have said virtually disposes of the error assigned upon the refusal of the court to grant a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. This proposed evidence is all directed