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 nature, or with the main intent of the parties, are to be rejected.” It cannot be disputed that the main intention of the parties to this contract was to create a present guaranty on the part of Mr. Brandenburg and a promise on the part of Mrs. Hall to refund to Mr. Brandenburg all amounts that he might pay under such guaranty, with twelve per cent. interest thereon. If there are any words in the contract inconsistent with that intention they must be rejected. In Belloni v. Freeborn, 63 N. Y. 383, it is said: “In guaranties, letters of credit, and other obligations of sureties, the terms used and the language employed are to have a reasonable interpretation, according to the intent of the parties as disclosed by the instrument read in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the purposes for which it was made.” In McNaughton v. Conkling, 9 Wis. 316, it was contended, as in this case, that the agreement was only an offer to guaranty by some subsequent proceeding, but the court said: “We have no doubt that the words of the letter amount to and were designed as a present undertaking of guaranty, needing only to he acted upon by any one for whom they were intended, with notice to the writer in order to bind him. It is true the future tense is used, ‘I will guaranty,’ etc., but this form is frequently used in instruments which are intended as present agreements without anything further being necessary to bind the party using it.” And to same effect see Carman v. Elledge, 40 Iowa 409; Talmadge v. Williams, 27 La. Ann. 653. Nor do I think it correct to say as matter of law that plaintiff did not sell the goods relying upon the guaranty, simply because he had never seen the guaranty. He was informed by the Halls that Mr. Brandenburg had guarantied their bill to a certain amount, and sold the goods relying upon that fact. If, under these circumstances, the contract had been a clear, explicit, and unequivocal guaranty, the liability of the guarantor could not, as I think, be questioned under the authorities cited in the prevailing opinion. And if the contract in this case was properly construed as such guaranty, the same rule would, of course, apply. When a guaranty in fact exists, and a party acts upon the strength of it, and in strict accordance with its terms, it would be unreasonable thatthe guarantor should not be bound