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 would have saved them the payment of thousands of dollars of taxes annually. Said the court in U. S. v. Johnson, 124 U. S. 236, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446: “In view of the foregoing facts, the case comes fairly within the rule announced by this court that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with its execution, especially when it has long prevailed, is entitled to great weight, and should not be disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons, and unless it be clear that such construction is erroneous.” While the construction of this statute had not prevailed for a very long time, it was sustained by the voluntary concurrence of all the corporations interested in defeating such interpretation. In U. S. v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 62, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413, the court, in stating the rule, eliminated the element of time, saying: "A contemporaneous construction by the officers upon whom was imposed the duty of executing those statutes, is entitled to great weight, and, since it is not clear that that construction was erroneous, it ought not now to be overturned.” To same effect, Hahn v. U. §.,107 U. S. 402, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494; U. S. v. Pugh, 99 U. S. 265; Browa v. U. S., 113 U. S. 568, 5 Sup. Ot. Rep. 648, and cases cited. Our statute embodies this principle: “Contemporaneous construction is, in general, the best.” § 4722, Comp. Laws. The act of 1889 (chapter 107) is a legislative construction of the act of 1883. Among other provisions, not important to be considered, it declares that “any company which has not complied with the provisions of chapter 99 of the Session Laws of 1883 by paying all taxes claimed on gross earnings, both territorial and interstate,” etc. Said the court in U. 8. v. Freeman, 3 How. 556: “And if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in part materia what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute they will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.” The soundness of this doctrine is expressly recognized in the prevailing opinion in this case in connection with the construction of the act of congress containing the land grant to the appellant, and it is applied in the case where the subsequent legislative construction of a prior act is much less emphatic and unmistakable than is the interpretation placed upon the gross