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 some point in Washington to some point in Minnesota $1,000 of freight is earned by the company. Under the view adopted in the prevailing opinion, none of these gross earnings—i. e., the $1,000—have arisen from the operation of the railroad within any one of these states. If that opinion embodies a correct interpretation of such a statute, it would be the opinion of the supreme court of each of these ‘states. We would then have the unanimous voice of all these final tribunals declaring that, although this $1,000 had been earned by the operation of the road within these four states, yet in fact none of these earnings arose from the operation of the road within any one of these states. We go farther, and say that, even if it could be claimed that the act of 1883 would admit of two constructions equally obvious, still it does not follow that that should not be adopted which would now make the statute unconstitutional, for the reason that when that law was enacted it was the general opinion of the profession and of courts that the federal supreme court had ruled that a tax on the gross receipts of a corporation arising not only from local, but also from interstate, commerce was valid. The supreme courts of Ohio and Missouri had already placed this construction on the federal court decision. We cannot assume that the legislature which passed this law was wiser than courts of eminent standing, which had before and which subsequently held such a law valid; nor that it entertained any other view of the question than that previously expressed by the courts of two of the states, but also by the highest arbiter, the federal supreme court itself; Ohio and Missouri having already declared that the court had so held. The principle underlying the doctrine that the meaning must be chosen which will render the statute constitutional is that the legislature must be deemed to have understood the true scope of the constitution, and therefore that the other construction would render their act void. But this rule can have no application where the profession, the highest courts of states, and, apparently, the highest court of the nation, had agreed at the time the act was passed that, giving it its broadest scope, its obvious meaning, it was nevertheless not condemned by the federal constitution. In short, when the act of 1883 was passed, it was regarded as settled