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 to their attention, disregard such erroneous decision, and declare a patent wrongfully issued in accordance therewith void, or, if necessary, at the suit of such grantee, oust from the possession of the land the holders of such patent. Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 985; Mining Co. v. Campbell, 135 U. S. 286, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 765; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; Francoeur v. Newhouse, 40 Fed. Rep. 620; Railroad Co. v. Cannon, 46 Fed. Rep. 224; Railroad Co. v. Amacker, Id 233; Railroad Co. v. Barden, Id 600. Under the pre-emption law, although the commissioner of the general land office or the secretary of the interior possesses such power of supervision over the district land officers as authorizes the correcting or annulling of entries allowed by them where the lands were not subject to entry, or the parties did not possess the qualifications required, yet, is it held that their power is not unlimited or arbitary? It can only be exercised when the entry was made on false testimony, or without authority of law. It does not prevent a qualified entryman, by a duly made entry of land, open to entry, securing, prior to the approval of such entry by the commissioner or secretary, a vested right therein, and a right to a patent therefor, of which he can no more be deprived by an order of the commissioner or secretary than he can be deprived by such order of any other lawfully acquired property. Cornelius v. Kessell, 128 U. S. 461, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122; Smith v. Ewing, 23 Fed. Rep. 741; Stimson v. Clarke, 45 Fed. Rep. 762. And so, under the homestead law, by an entry properly made, with the district officers, the entryman acquired an interest in the land, indefeasible except by his own default. 17 Op. Attys. Gen. 160; Wilson v. Fine, 40 Fed. Rep. 52. And since it sufficiently appears from the allegations of the bill that the company was entitled to select this area of lands to make up the quantity granted, that the lands selected were of the lands subject to the right of selection, and that the selections were made by the company in the manner prescribed by the secretary, we are of the opinion that it shows the legal title to these specific lands has vested in the plaintiff, notwithstanding the failure of the secretary to approve the selections. The alleged refusal by the sccretary to approve these selections