Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/349

 Maryland, 4 Wheat. 415; Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; State v. Lancaster Co., 4 Neb. 540; Cooley, Tax’n (2d Ed.) c. 2, passim. And, as the actions which are complained of in this case, and against which relief is sought, resulted directly from and flow out of the exercise by the territorial legislature of a power that was unquestionably reposed in it by the organic act, the judicial department of the government cannot and will not interfere unless it clearly appears that either the legislative department has exceeded its power, or that the regularly constituted officers of the territorial government have usurped powers or functions not properly belonging to them, and in carrying out such usurpation will inflict irreparable injury and damage to the appellant.

It appears from the complaint that appellant’s lands have been assessed for taxation for the year 1887, and that, as the appellant has refused to pay the taxes so assessed, the respond- ent threatens to and will sell’said lands to satisfy said taxes, unless enjoined by this court. It is admitted that, if the gross earnings law of 1883, hereinafter referred to (Sess. Laws 1883, c. 99), is a valid and constitutional law, and exempts the property in question from taxation, the threatened action of respondent is unlawful. But this conceded fact would not, of itself, entitle appellant to invoke the aid of a court of equity. It is necessary that some additional facts be shown, so as to bring the case under some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence. Cooley, Tax’n, 760. The case at bar shows such additional facts by reason of the provisions of § 67 of chapter 28 of the Political Code of Dakota territory, which enacts, in substance, that the purchaser of any tract of land sold for taxes shall be entitled to a certificate of sale, describing the land so sold, the sum paid, and the time when the purchaser will be entitled to a deed, and which shall be assignable, “and shall be presumptive evidence of the regularity of all prior proceedings.” It is unquestionably true that the issuance of this certificate creates a cloud upon the title to the land described therein, as said certificate is prima facie evidence, by the express terms of the statute, of the regularity of a!l prior proceedings, including the taxability of the lands. It follows that the case at bar presents