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 Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460. Even the assessment of several lots at a gross sum, where no fraud is alleged or injury shown, is no reason for setting aside the assessment. State v. Taylor, 35 N. J. Law 184; Dundy v. Commissioners, 1 N. W. Rep. 565. Nor is assessment to the wrong person. Conway v. Younkin, 28 Iowa 295. Nor assessment after the time limited by law. Woodman v. Ely, 2 Fed. Rep. 839. The power of the treasurer to sell is derived from the statute itself and it matters not whether the tax warrant was issued by the commissioners or not. Railroad Co. v. Carroll County, 41 Iowa 153; Parker v. Sexton, 29 Iowa 421; Johnson v. Chase, 30 Iowa 308; Snell v. City of Fort Dodge, 45 Iowa 564; Company v. Dean, 41 N. W. Rep. 504. The plaintiff must tender the amount of the tax in order to have the sale enjoined. Stetson v. Freeman, 14 Pac. Rep. 256; Belz v. Bird, 1 Pac. Rep. 246; Bank v. Lewis, 2 Sa Rep. 243 ; Wartensleben v. Haithcock, 1 So. Rep. 38; Alexander v. Merrick, 13 N. E. Rep. 190; Dillon v. Merriam, 34 N. W. Rep. 344; Hershy v. Thompson, 8 8. W. Rep. 689; Gage v. Carsher, 17 N. E. Rep. 777; Morrison v. Jacoby, 14 N. E. Rep. 546; State v. Casteel, 11 N. E. Rep. 219; Rowe v. Peabody, 1 N. EB Rep. 353; Knox v. Dunn, 22 Kan. 683,

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Winchester, J. This action was brought by the appellant in September, 1888, to restrain the respondent, as county treasurer of McLean county, from selling certain lands in said county, and described in the amended complaint, for taxes. levied and assessed therecn in the year 1887, amounting to $4,803. The respondent demurs to the appellant’s bill, upon the ground that said bill did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was sustained by the lower court and the action was dismissed. Judgment was duly entered by respondent against appellant, and from this judgment the present appeal was taken by the appellant.

The sole question we have to consider is whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The complaint avers that the appellant is a corporation organized under the act of congress approved July 2, 1864, entitled “Am