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 How. 369; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436; Wright v. Sill, 2 Black 544; Delaware Tax Case, 18 Wall. 206; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J. Law 557; United, etc., Co. v. Commissioner, 37 N. J. Law 240; State Lottery v. New Orleans, 24 La. Ann. 86; Leroy v. Railroad Co., 18 Mich. 233; State Bank v. People, 5 Ill. 303; St. Louis v. Savings Bank, 49 Mo. 574; Bank v. Commonwealth, 6 Bush. 127; Mobile v. Insurance Co., 53 Ala. 570. If there is any doubt as to the meaning of a statute that doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of the law. The presumption that the legislature in- tended to act within the constitutional limits operates to resolve a doubt so as to sustain a statute. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, 233; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 554; Palms v. Shawano, 61 Wis. 217; Colwell v. May’s Landing Co., 19 N. J. Kg. 249; Attorney General v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 438; Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa 8; Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa 227; Cranda County v. Brogden, 112 U. 8. 261; Sykes v. Mayor, 55 Miss. 115.

J. M. Bartholomew, for respondent LaMoure County:

Appellant’s position is that it has never acquired any taxable title to these lands, but that it has acquired some indefinite and undetermined equity therein which enables it to ask the protection of a court of chancery. Respondent’s position is that appellant has a taxable title to said lands or it has no interest whatever in said lands that gives it a standing in court. Respondent claims that appellant has done every act that it is re quired by its grant to do to entitle it to a patent for these lands, and if that be true then the lands are clearly taxable. Railroad Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 608; Ross v. Outagamie Co., 12 Wis. 29; Railroad Co. v. Trempeleau Co., 35 Wis. 258; Railroad Co. v. Taylor Co., 52 Wis. 37; Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa 221; Railroad Co. v. Holdsworth, 47 Iowa 20. But the chief contention in this case arises upon appellant’s claim of immunity from taxation by reason of the “Gross Earnings Law.” But it cannot be claimed that this statutory provision is more effective and far reaching than a charter provision exempting all property from taxation, and it