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 escape payment of the price, because it is said the title instantly vested in him and his associates in the contract, not only without his assent, but against his will. What, then, becomes of the doctrine that one party to a contract cannot, except in special cases, enforce specific performance thereof, but must make his claim for damages? And what becomes of the authorities recognized as sound by respondents’ own cases, which hold that the party who has something to do must not, after notice of refusal from the other party, go on with the work, and thus increase the liability of such other party to him? Respondents seem to urge that at no time is notice of refusal to perform efficacious to prevent performance on the other side except at the moment that the party breaking the compact is bound to perform. Their own cases are against this position. Said the court in Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 533: “The plantiffs rights are invaded by repudiation of the contract only when it produces the effect of non-performance on his part or prevents him from entering upon or completing performance on his part, at atime when, and in a manner in which he is entitled to perform it or have it performed.” It may well be true that where the performance by the party notified not to perform consists of a single act—as the tender of a deed—notice before the time for such delivery will not warrant an action for damages; but where the final act of tender is the culmination of other acts which in the nature of the case, must precede it—as where the party is to manufacture or build the thing to be delivered—then it is quite clear that the conduct which before the time of delivery prevents the taking of the preliminary steps—the manufacture of the article or the erection of the building—as effectually prevents, before the day of tender arrives, the possibility of delivery, as though that day in fact had arrived, and a tender of the thing had been rejected. In such a case the contract is as effectually broken by the notice not to go on with it, given before the day of delivery arrives—the person who is to do the work having then the right to enter upon the performance of the same—as though the notice had been given on the very day of delivery. The question in all cases is whether one party has prevented performance by the other party at the time when