Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/313

 The fact that such motion was made irregularly, and in disregard of the statutes, does not obliterate the statute nor relieve the plaintiff of its obligations. The day the verdict came in, the court granted a 90-day stay, to give plaintiff ample time for settling a bill, and moving for a new trial; but the stay expired, and no attempt to give notice of intention or settle a bill was made within the stay, or until some years had elapsed after the verdict, and not until after plaintiff's alleged motion for a new trial was denied. (Can the fact that plaintiff in good faith proceeded to move for new trial in a manner wholly unknown to the law be legitimately urged as an extenuation for the laches and default involved in disregarding the law? We think not. Briefly stated, the plaintiff's right to have a bill or statement settled began to run in June, 1887, but no attempt to setttle a bill or statement was initiated until April, 1891, and, while no obstacle to such settlement was interposed by the defendant, the bill itself was not in fact settled for nearly four years after the right and duty to settle a bill originated. But appellant’s counsel claims that he has met the requirement of the statute by showing good cause for the extension of time, and hence the extension is right. Counsel cites Johnson y. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., decided by this court in 1 N. D. 354. This court held in that case, under § 5093, Comp. Laws, that it was the purpose of the act to place “the whole matter of settling bills and statements for a new trial, and giving the notice of intention, within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court as to the time within which the several steps in the process may be taken after the statutory limit has been passed.” We also held that “abuse of discretion will not be inferred from the mere fact that the record is irregular in not showing the grounds upon which the court proceeded.” This holding imports—and such is our present view of the law—that the district court, under the statute, has been vested with authority in these cases to extend time and fix new time where the statutory limit has run, but that such authority can be lawfully exercised only upon the condition set out in the statute—i. e., “upon good causé shown;” and, further, that cases may arise under the statute where this court will be in duty bound to exercise its supervisory functions