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 C. 360, 9 S. E. Rep. 338; State v. Somers’ Point, 52 N. J. Law 32,18 Atl. Rep. 695; Clark v. City of Cape May, 50 N. J. Law? 558, 14 Atl. Rep. 581; Trust Co. v. Whithed, 2 N. D.—, 49 N. W. Rep. 318. This list might be greatly enlarged. We are inclined to the view that under the authorities, had the legislature not closed the door against accessions to the class of counties having a court house and jail exceeding $35,000 in value, the classification would have been proper. But an arbitrary time is fixed, after which no county coming within the same conditions which characterize the class can gain admittance to such class. “Provided, that nothing in this act shall permit the removal to or relocation of the county seat of any county * * * wherein the court house and jail now erected exceed in value the sum of $35,000.” This classification is not based upon natural reason, but upon the arbitrary fiat of the legislature. While it may be true that the county seat ought not to be so easily relocated in a county wherein the loss to the taxpayer wi!l be greater by reason of the erection at the existing county seat of expensive buildings as in the county where such loss will be comparatively trifling in amount, it is not reasonable that the mere time when such expensive buildings are constructed should at all enter into the consideration of the matter. This law was approved March 7, 1890. So far as the value of improvements is concerned, it accepts only those counties wherein the court house and jail now erected exceed in value the sum of $35,000. If the word “now” refers to the date of approval of the act, all counties having a court house and jail exceeding $35,000 in value on the 8th of March of that year, but not on the 7th; or if the word “now” refers to the date when the act took effect, 7. ¢., July 1st, all counties in which the court house and jail worth more than $35,000 should be completely erected on July 2d instead of July 1st—would nevertheless be subject to the provisions of the new law, although the natural reason can suggest no justification of such a distinction. If the danger of serious loss to the taxpayer by the removal of a county seat from a place at which expensive buildings have been constructed affords reason for placing counties in which such a condition exists in a separate class, to