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 same. But this construction, as is readily apparent, destroys the statute. The legislature had already, by § 5778, set off to the widow all the specific property that the law absolutely exempts, and more; and hence, if appellant's construction be correct, there was nothing whatever for § 5779 to act upon, and its presence in the statute is entirely superfluous. The wording of the statute does not require any such narrow construction. Section 5128 exempts “goods, chattels, merchandise, money, or other personal property, not to exceed in the aggregate fifteen hundred dollars in value, which isalso exempt, and must be chosen and appraised as hereinafter provided.” The lawcreates a general present exemption to the amount of $1,500. The debtor, by his selection, converts this general exemption into a specific exemption. The law requires him to make the exemption specific in that manner or waive it. The power that he has is not to create an exemption but to waive one that the law has already created for his benefit. We do not understand the case of Mann v. Welton, 21 Neb. 541, 32 N. W. Rep. 599, cited by appellant, to conflict with those views, but rather to sustain them. In that case there was exempt “the sum of five hundred dollars in personal property.” The debtor was required to make a sworn inventory, and that was followed by an appraisement and selection. The debtor took no steps to make the exemption attach to any specific property, but brought replevin against the officer. The court said that when the selection was made, “then, and not until then, does the character or quality of exemption attach to the specific property to the extent that replevin may be maintained for its possession.” Had the husband lived, he could, as against any legal process, have held all the property that was turned over to the widow for the support and maintenance of his family. We cannot think that the legislature intended to give the family less protection when the husband and father was dead than when he was living. See Bank v. Freeman, 1 N. D. 196, 46 N. W. Rep. 36.

It is also contended that the property so set apart to the widow is only to be “ possessed and used” by her temporarily, and must be accounted for in the final distribution of the estate. Whatever may be the holding in other states, our statutes are