Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/265

 authority of a judge at chambers. Here, with the exceptions stated in the statute, the district court is “always open.” Comp. Laws, § 4828. But when our present appeal law was originally adopted in the state of Wisconsin, from which state we borrowed it, a condition of affairs existed much the same as that in Minnesota when Gere v. Weed was decided, and subdivision 5, supra, was framed to meet the practice then existing in that state, but which does not exist here; and, as was intimated in Insurance Co. v. Weber, that subdivision can have only a limited application here. In this state, where a court matter, after a notice and a hearing, has been decided, and an order made, whether signed by the judge or by the court, or put in the minutes, such order is not an order at chambers, but is an order of the district court, and, if the same is appealable, the appeal must be taken from such order within the time allowed by statute. Nor will a motion made after the time elapses for an appeal prolong such time. See authorities cited in Insurance Co. v. Weber. From these views it follows that the appeal must be dismissed. Such will be the order. All concur.

The Travelers’ Insuraance Company, a Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GERTRUDE WeBER, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal From Justice—Dismissal—Order of Judge—Vacating Order—Right to Appeal.

1. An order, made by a judge of the district court to show cause why an appeal from a justice's court should not be dismissed, cited the appellant to “show cause before the court at chambers,” etc. An order was made dismissing the appeal, which recited that it was made after hearing both sides on the return of the order to show cause. The order of dismissal was not made at a general or special term of the district court, nor did it recite in terms that it was made “by the court.” Only the following words were appended to the judge’s signature to the order: “Judge District Court, Richland County, N.D.” Held, that it appears from the record that the order of dismissal was an order of the district court, and was not a mere “chambers order.”