Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/238

 The record shows that the action was commenced July 30, 1890, by the personal service of the summons and complaint, An injunctional order was also served upon defendant at the same time. This order—after a hearing, which was had on August 5, 1890—was so modified as to permit defendant to harvest the crop then growing upon the land, but forbade defendant from doing any plowing or other acts looking towards a farther tilling or cropping of the land. The injunctional order was disobeyed by the defendant, and he was brought before the district court in November, 1890, and a fine of $10 was entered against defendant for the contempt involved in disobeying such injunctional order. It appears that the fine was not paid, aud no attempt was made to enforce its payment. In April, 1891, the defendant began seeding the land, and, that fact being made to appear by affidavit, the district court cited defendant into court to show cause on April 20, 1891, why he should not be punished for contempt in that he had disobeyed said order of the district court made on August 5th preceding. On the hearing the defendant showed cause by affidavit setting out the facts and circumstances of his occupation of the land in detail, and justifying such occupation upon substantially the same grounds stated in his answer. The district court—Judge TEMPLETON presiding by request—discharged the defendant, and did not punish him for the alleged contempt. On the 25th of June, 1891, an order was made appointing one H. D. Hurley receiver in the action, “with full power to harvest the crops now growing on said land, and to secure and thresh the same, and to hold the proceeds thereof, after paying the expenses of harvesting, threshing, and marketing the same, subject to the further order of the court, upon his executing a bond, as required by statute, in the sum of $1,000, and taking oath as required by law.” This order was wholly ex parte. The order appointing a receiver was served upon defendant in Traill county on July 29, 1891. The order purports on its face to be made wholly upon affidavit. It reads: “On reading the foregoing affidavit and considering the same.” We find that the affidavit referred to in the order was made by C. E. Leslie, Esq., the same attorney who verified the complaint on information and belief. It will be unnecessary