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 position that the failure of the board of equalization to meet is of no moment in equity unless thé citizen avers the injustice of the tax. The court said: “It is also objected that the assessors did not meet for the purpose of hearing objections as required by the charter. We are unable to say from the evidence that this objection is true in point of fact. It appears from the evidence on both sides that the assessors did meet and the most that can be said is that it does not appear that they were all present at any one time. We shall not determine what would be the effect of an entire omission of this meeting by the assessors.” In the case of Land Company v. City of Crete, 11 Neb. 344, 7 N. W. Rep. 859, the opinion merely states the conclusion of the court on this point without any attempt to justify that conclusion by reasoning or fortify it by authority. The case of Cowell v. Doub, 12 Cal. 273, is not in point The assessment was, after it had been irregularly made, confirmed by an dct of the legislature; and it was of the hearing accorded to the taxpayer by this act of which it was insisted he did not have the statutory notice. But there was nothing in the case to show that the original assessment, before it was confirmed, was not sufficiently legal to sustain a tax in equity. There was nothing to warrant the conclusion that a full opportunity for a hearing had not been accorded the taxpayer under the original proceedings. The irregularities may, for aught the report of the case discloses, have been in matters which do not affect the substantial rights of the citizen. Surely, if the tax was so valid before the passage of the confirming act that it could not be assailed in equity without payment or tender, the enactment of that statute did not detract from such validity. Mining Co. v. Auditor General, 37 Mich. 391, is not directly in point. The court expressly held that the taxpayer was not deprived of a hearing. The facts and an extract from the opinion will show this conclusively. The assessment was made by a supervisor of a township in the year 1874. In making the assessment he took the original assessment roll for the year 1873, and made in it certain changes of valuation. This was all done before the time he was required to have his roll ready for review. No other changes, with a single trifling exception, not in any man-