Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/151

 curve, and there is eminent authority for the proposition that, unless the curve is abnormally sharp, the courts will not regard it as evidence of carelessness. Tuttle v. Railroad Co., 122 U. & 189, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1166., The language of the court in this case, both on this point and the further point of contributory negligence, because the injured servant stood upon the inside of the curve in making the coupling, is very applicable here: "The perils in the present case arising from the sharpness of the curve were seen and known. They were not like the defects of unsafe machinery which the employer has neglected to repair, and which his employes have reason to suppose is in proper working condition. Everything was open and visible, and the deceased had only to use his senses and his faculties to avoid the dangers to which he was exposed. One of these dangers was that of the draw-bars passing each other when the cars were brought together. It was his duty to look out for this, and avoid it. The danger existed only on the inside of the curve, and this must have been known to him." On the question whether it was negligent to build a switch and with so sharp a curve, the court observed: "We have carefully read the evidence presented by the bill of exceptions, and, although it appears that the curve was a very sharp one at the place where the accident happened, yet we do not think that public policy requires the courts to lay down any rule of law to restrict a railroad company as to the curves it shall use at its freight depots and yards, where the safety of passengers and the public is not involved, much less that it should be left to the varying opinion of juries to determine such an engineering question." It is true that in the Tuttle case there was no one standing on the foot board on the outside of the curve, as in the case at bar; but, if the brakeman was bound in the Tuttle case to know that it was dangerous to stand on the inside when there was no one on the outside, surely the plaintiff in this case was bound to know that his position was one of danger, although there was some one standing on the outside. The fact that another stood in one of the places of safety did not render the place occupied by plaintiff any less dangerous or obscure his sense of that danger. The other place of safety was outside of the space