Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/125

 But we have been somewhat embarrassed by reason of our previous legislation on this subject. By chapter 34, Laws 1885, heretofore mentioned, these associations were confined in their operations to their own members and were not allowed to charge interest, as such, to exceed 12 per cent. per annum. That chapter was amended by chapter 34 of the Laws of 1887, but was not changed in the particulars above mentioned; but in 1889 another act pertaining to these associations was passed (chapter 40, Laws 1889), § 7 of which reads as follows: "That any funds of such corporation not loaned for a period of more than thirty days, and for which there is no sufficient demand under the provisions of the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the corporation, may be loaned by the corporation at any rate of interest allowed by law, upon any security approved and accepted by the board of directors of said corporation." This section, as we construe it, authorizes these associations, upon the conditions in the section specified, to loan their funds to outside parties at legal rates of interest. It must be conceded that, as to such transactions, building and loan associations differ in no material respect from other money-loaning institutions, and that as to them all the reasons upon which legislative classifications are sustained are wanting. Hence, if the exception contained in § 11 of chapter 184 of the Laws of 1890 must be held to include such transaction, then such chapter is not uniform in its operation and violates the constitutional provision. But, if consistent with legal principles, it is our duty to harmonize this statute with the constitution, and our efforts should first be directed towards ascertaining, if we can, the true intent and purpose of the legislature in the enactment of said § 11. The statute-the whole statute in which said section is found - is the first source to which we should turn for information, and it is also our right and duty to consider all other statutes in pari materia. Suth. St. Const. 316, and cases cited. "The general intent must be kept in view in determining the scope and meaning of any part." Id 317, and cases cited. The one prominent thought pervading the statute in question is the suppression of the mischief of usury. The sweeping terms used, the harsh and unusual penalties pre-