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 as it is operative, its burdens and benefits must bear alike upon all persons and things upon which it does operate, and the statute must contain no provision that would exclude or impede this uniform operation upon all citizens, or all subjects and places, within the state, provided they were brought within the relations and circumstances specified in the act. McGill v. State, 34 Ohio St. 246; Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 554; Darling v. Rodgers, 7 Kan. 592; Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, Id 479; Groesch v. State, 42 Ind. 547; Heanley v. State, 74 Ind. 993B State v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458; People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 398; Mc- Aunich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Humes v. Railway Co., 82 Mo. 221; Railway Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155.

From the foregoing proposition it follows of necessity that the legislature has power to classify persons and subjects for the purpose of legislation, and to enact laws applying specially to such classes, and, while the laws thus enacted operate uniformly upon all members of the class, they are not vulnerable to the constitutional inhibition under consideration. But this power of the legislature is circumscribed. It is not an arbitrary power waiting the whim of the legislature. Its exercise must always be within the limits of reason, and of a necessity more or less pronounced. Classification must be based upon such differences in situation, constitution or purposes, between the persons or things included in the class and those excluded therefrom, as fairly and naturally suggest the propriety of and necessity for different or exclusive legislation in the line of the statute in which the classification appears. State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. Law 439; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 33 N. W. Rep. 800; Board v. Buck, 51 N. J. Law 155, 16 Atl. Rep. 698; Railway Co. v. Markley, 45 N. J. Eq. 139, 16 At. Rep. 436; Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal. 142, 8 Pac. Rep. 813; City of Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa. St. 328, 16 Atl. Rep. 788; Hanlon v. Board, 53 Ind. 123; State v. Reitz, 62 Ind. 159.

The application of these principles to the case before us will advance us toward a correct conclusion. By § 11 above quoted, our legislature placed building and loan associations, incorporated under the laws of this state, in a separate class, and excepted them from the operation of the usury law. Is this