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 55 Ill. 288; Wright v. Walker, 30 Ark. 44; Cleavinger v. Reimer, 3 Watts & S. 486; Lynn v. Morse, 76 Iowa 665, 39 N. W. Rep. 203; Harper v. Perry, 28 Iowa 57; Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494; Briggs v. Hodgdon, 78 Me. 514, 7 Atl. Rep. 387. Many more cases on this point are found in the books, some of them, like the case in 101 U. S., only going to the extent of declaring that the attorney cannot, without the client's consent, purchase an antagonistic interest. This qualification is usually found in controversies between the attorney and client. The precise point was raised and fully discussed in Cunningham v. Jones, supra, and the conclusion reached that the failure of the client to object did not in any manner validate the transaction. See, also, West v. Raymond, 21 Ind. 305. I think this conclusion is Bound. If the purchase by an attorney of a title to the subject- matter of the litigation antagonistic to the title of his client can be assailed only by the client, then the strongest temptation is held out to the attorney to abuse the confidence of the client to exercise his power and influence over the client to prevent any objection on his part, and it need not be stated that the attorney's efforts in that direction would be successful in a large percentage of cases. 'To so hold, it seems to me, would be to invite the very results that the law abhors. I think the courts should forever remove this temptation by declaring all such purchases void, by whomsoever attacked. These are not the views of the court, however. Another class of transactions which have met with the displeasure of the courts is that by which the attorney purchases from the client the client's interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Some most respectable courts have held that such a purchase could not be made while the relation of attorney and client continued. West v. Raymond, supra; Hall v. Hallet, 1 Cox 134; Rogers v. Marskall, supra. And we nowhere find that this rule has been relaxed further than to hold that such transaction is presumptively fraudulent, and the burden rests upon the attorney to establish the perfect fairness, adequacy, and equity of the transaction. Bingham v. Salene, 15 Or. 208, 14 Pac. Rep. 523; Dunn v. Dunn, 42 N. J. Eq. 431, 7 Atl. Rep. 842. Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91, 100; Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N. Y. 167. Viewed in