Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/69

 McCartney, 17 Minn. 76, (Gil. 54.) By the great weight of authority, the same rule obtains as to parties where, as in Dakota territory, the statute permits parties to testify as witnesses, and does not limit the right of cross-examination. People v. Giblin, (N. Y.) 21 N. E. Rep. 1062. The question of privilege is not presented in the case at bar, as the witness did not claim his privilege. See People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571; Yanke v. State, 51 Wis. 464, 8 N. W. Rep. 276; McBride v. Wallace, 29 N. W. Rep. 75; People v. Cummins, 11 N. W. Rep. 184; Anarchists’ Case, 12 N. E. Rep. opinion age: 979. In State v. Pfefferle, (Kan.) 12 Pac. Rep. 406, the court says: “Where a defendant in a criminal case takes the witness stand to testify in his own behalf, he assumes the character of a witness, and is entitled to the same privileges and subject to the same treatment, and to be contradicted, discredited, or impeached, the same as any ot her witness.” See People v. Clark, (N. Y.) 8 N. E. Rep. 38; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380; State v. Cox, id. 392. Since the above-cited Missouri cases were decided, a statute has limited the right of cross-examination in that state. Formerly, there was a statute in Michigan as follows: “The defendant shall be at liberty to make a statement to the court or jury, and may be cross-examined upon any such statement.” Sess. Laws 1861, p. 169. The case of Gale v. People, 26 Mich. 157, was a decision made under the Michigan statute above referred to, but the case is not authority here, as we have no similar statute. Under a later statute, the rule in Michigan is the same as that adopted by the court below. People v. Cummins, supra. The cases cited in the brief of defendant’s counsel, upon this point, from the states of California, Michigan, Missouri, and Oregon are, respectively, adjudications made upon local statutes restricting the common-law right of cross-examination upon collateral matters for purposes of impeachment. We hold that the right of cross-examination as to outside matters of fact, which affect the general character of the witness, and tend to degrade him, and affect his credibility, is within the limits of a sound judicial discretion, a salutary rule. We find no abuse of judicial discre-