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 the passage of the act of congress of July 15, 1870, pertaining to survey fees; and no part of said survey fees had been repaid to the United States at the time of such sale. Prior to the assessment and levy of said taxes, for which said lands were sold, the railroad company had disposed of the lands and conveyed them to third parties by de and contracts, and such third parties were in possession. Said lands were regularly assessed, and all the proceedings leading up to the tax-sale were regular. Plaintiff bought the land at such tax-sale, and brings the action to recover the purchase money so paid. Held, that such lands were not taxable at the time of such assessment, because the United States held the fee title to said lands, and had a lien thereon for survey fees, (Railroad Co. v. Rockne, 115 U. 8. 600, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201;) but that, since land was a subject of taxation in Dakota Territory, prima facie these lands were taxable. Taxation was the rule; freedom from taxation the exception. Tyler v. Cass Co., 369.

Office of county assessor has been abolished and office of district assessor created. State ex rel v. Harris, 190.

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1. The duties of an assessor in fixing values upon property are judicial in their nature, and cannot be performed by deputy, in the absence of an express statute. The city assessor of a city organized under chapter 24 of the Political Code of Dakota Territory has no authority to appoint a deputy; and an assessment of the property of such city by a pretend deputy assessor, which was never in any manner opted or ratified by the city assessor, is a nullity, and no tax can be predicated thereon. ''Farrington v. N. E Inv. Co., 102''. ''Bode v. N. E. Inv. Co., 121''.

2. In an action in equity brought to cancel certain tax certificates and annul tax proceeding, held, that a county assessment made by the roper assessor, in the proper time and manner, on the proper blank forms for listing and assessing property, but not copied into the assessment roll until after such assessor resigned, was not void in equity when it appears that said assessment was in fact copied accurately into the assessment roll, and there is no showing that said assessment was in any manner unfair or inequitable. Held, further, that the absence of any verification of such assessment roll did not invalidate the assessment in equity. Id.

3. The assessor being a judicial officer where property is exempt from taxation by class, and not by specific description, he has full jurisdiction, and it is his duty to decide in each instance whether or not a particular piece of property falls within any of the exempted classes, and in this respect the source of the law that establishes the exemption is immaterial. Tyler v. Cass Co., 369.

4. An erroneous decision of the assessor in the matter of exemptions does not deprive the tax proceedings of jurisdiction; but, until such erroneous decision is modified or set aside by the proper tribunal all officers with subsequent functions may safely act thereon. Id.

5. Held, also, that a subsequent statute, authorizing municipalities to reassess for street improvements where a former assessment was for any cause invalid, as to all property upon which euch former assessment had not been paid, was intended for the benefit of the taxing municipalities only, and that where such municipality had received the amount of the former assessment by the sale of the assessed property, the right of such municipality to aseeas such property for such improvement was extinguished, and could not be reasserted, and no. power of reassessment as to such property was given by such statute. Budge v. Grand Forks, 309.