Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/509

 1002, and cases cited. The view we take of the law renders the statement of only a few facts important. The assessed valuation of the district at the time the warrants were issued and the contract on which-they rest was made was $18,305. These pseudo warrants were given to Sargent & Germain on a contract between them and the defendant’s school board to erect a school house for the district for $6,000, which contract was fully performed by them. It does not appear that the district board was ever empowered to build any particular school house, or, indeed, any school house at all. The authority must come from the inhabitants at a district meeting. The minutes of such meeting disclose merely that a motion was made and carried to ballot to build a school house. The school board was appointed a building committee, and a tax of ten mills was levied for that purpose; but it nowhere appears that the inhabitants actually balloted to erect such a building or any school house, or in any manner authorized its construction. Nor does it appear that any site was ever selected, either by the inhabitants or by the district board. It was undisputed that the district never had any title to the land on which the house was erected; nor were any proceedings ever taken by the district for the purpose of acquiring title to the land, or to secure the right to build the school house thereon. That the action of the district board in making the contract to construct the building was wholly unauthorized and void cannot well be disputed. See Farmers, etc., Bank v. School District, No. 53, (Dak.) 42 N. W. Rep. 767. The power to designate a site and to authorize the building of a school house is vested exclusively in the inhabitants. But it is urged that although not originally binding upon the district, the contract has been ratified by the conduct of the inhabitants since the erection of the school house, and the issuing of the warrants representing the alleged contract price therefor. While we do not wish to be considered as assenting to this view of the evidence, we will assume for the purpose of this opinion that there was sufficient evidence of ratification to submit to the jury. Still we think the court would have been justified in rendering judgment for defendant. Nay, we hold it would have been the duty of the court to give such