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 writings as disclosing the fact that plaintiff was contracting for other parties. In either case he was in fact contracting in his own name for the benefit of others. The proposition was that “on your accepting this proposition we agree to give you,” etc. It was addressed to plaintiff, and by him accepted. That paintiffplaintiff [sic] under the statute could sue upon such contract in his own name is placed by the authorities beyond the realm of debate. In Iron, etc., Co. v. Lundberg, 121 U. 8. 451, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 958, the agreement on which the action was founded provided, so far as is material to this point, as follows: “I, Gustave Lundberg, agent for M. N. Hogland’s Sons & Co. of Stockholm, agree to sell,” etc. The court ruled that Lundberg could sue upon it in his own name. The court, after quoting the New York statute, couched in the same language as that of this state, and after stating that that statute controlled, as the case arose in the southern district of New York, said: “The case then stands thus: If the agreement to sell is an agreement made by Lundberg personally, and not in his capacity of agent of the Swedish firm, the price is likewise payable to him personally, and the action on the contract must be brought in his name even at common law. If, on the other hand, the agreement must be considered as made by Lundberg not in his individual capacity, but only 4s agent and in behalf of the Swedish firm, and for their benefit, then the price is payable to him as their agent and for their benefit, in the same sense in which an express promise to pay money to him as the agent of that firm would be a promise to pay him for their benefit; and therefore, by the law of New York, which governs this case, an action may be brought in his name. In either view, this action is rightfully brought.” To same effect are McLaughlin v. Bank, (Dak.) 43 N. W. Rep. 715; Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. 389; Ludwig v. Gillespie, 105 N. Y. 653, 11 N. E. Rep. 835.

The appellants ‘Thomas C. Power and John W. Power next urge that the court erred in directing a verdict against them, claiming that the question of their liability on the contract was, under the evidence, a question of fact. We cannot give our assent to this proposition. These appellants were held, if at all, by the signature of the words “Benton Line” to the contract by