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 all the way by water. A reasonable time to carry by water is a reasonable time during the period that navigation is possible. In Luke v. Lyde, supra, Lord Mansfield says, (page 887): “If a freighted ship becomes accidentally disabled on its voyage (without the fault of the master) the master has his option of two things—either to refit (if it can be done within convenient time,) or to hire another ship to carry the goods to the port of delivery. If the merchant disagrees to this, and will not let him do so, the master will be entitled to the whole freight of the full voyage. And so it was determined in the house of lords in that case of Lutwidge v. Grey, [H. L. 1773.]" In Clark y. Insurance Co., 2 Pick. 104, the question for decision was whether the ship-owner could recover insurance on freight, or freightage, as our statute terms it, he having delivered the cargo to the shipper, who demanded that it be immediately sent forward or delivered to him. At this time the vessel was in the port of Kennebunk, Me., into which she had put on her voyage to make repairs in consequence of damages suffered during a severe gale. It was found that it would take two months to put the vessel in proper trim to continue her voyage. The shipowner could not recover insurance if it was still in his power to earn his freight at the time he delivered the cargo to the shipper notwithstanding the demand; and the court ruled that the underwriters were not liable, because the ship-owner, to earn his freight, might have resumed and continued the voyage after the repairs had been made; that he was not bound to deliver at the intermediate port in spite of the delay except on receiving full freight. The court said: “One test of this reasoning would be to consider whether the merchant had a right to his goods at Kennebunk, against the will of the shipper, without paying freight. It has been already said that the contract of affreightment is not to be terminated at the will of one of the parties only. ‘Delays not occasioned by the fault of the owner or master of the ship may take place, which may operate most unpropitiously upon the merchant. Such are the delays by contrary winds, as that the best planned voyages are often frustrated. Such may be the case of an embargo. Such was the case in Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 Johns. 348, cited by the counsel in the