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 and we are not aware that it has ever been departed from by the federal supreme court. As the facts in this case come fully within the language used by the court in the above quotation, it follows that the defendant, at the time he executed the conveyance in this case, was the owner of the full equitable and beneficial title to the land, but that the naked legal title was held by the United States. We hold that the covenants in the deed can be satisfied with nothing less than the conveyance of the absolute title, both legal and equitable. Lord Ellenborough, in Howell v. Richards, 11 East, 633, said: “The covenant of title is an assurance to the purchaser that the grantor has the very estate in quantity and quality which he purports to convey.” The legal title being in the government, defendant did not convey to the plaintiff complete equitable, legal, and alienable title to the land, and hence the covenant of seisin was broken.

The more difficult question in this case, however, pertains to the correct rule of damages for such breach. It has been repeatedly announced, both in the text-books and in the decided cases, that the measure of damages for the breach of the covenants of seisin was the consideration paid, with interest. In numberless cases this statement stands unqualified. But an examination of the cases will show that in each instance a paramount title had been asserted, or that the grantee took nothing by the conveyance for the reason that the grantor had no interest to convey. Very many of the cases where this language has been used were cases where the grantee, who had been evicted by paramount title, was seeking to recover the actual value of the premises at the time of the eviction. The courts of this country, however, and generally, though not uniformly, of England, have limited the recovery to the consideration paid, and interest, irrespective of the extent to which the value of the premises has been augmented, either through an expenditure of money, or by reason of the favorable situation of the premises. The rule that is generally adopted in the United States is very clearly stated by Kent, C. J., in Statts v. Ten Eycks’ Ex’rs, 3 Caines, 111, and the English rule is well stated in Mayne, Dam. (2d Ed.) 147. The general rule as thus stated was applied by the court in this case. Appellant contends that this case