Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/425

 county auditor, and deducted from the next money due the state on account of taxes. The county treasurer or auditor shall be liable on their bond for any loss occasioned by any such wrongful act.” This section is nearly identical with § 97, c. 11, Gen. St. Minn., and it is claimed that in adopting the section this state adopts it with the construction put upon it by the courts of Minnesota. Such is undoubtedly the general rule. McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. 8. 619, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 142; Railroad Co. v. Moore, 121 U. S. 558, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1334 The supreme court of Minnesota in State v. Cronkhite, 28 Minn. 197, 9 N. W. Rep. 681, held that the Minnesota statute applied to sales made before, as well as after, the act. There was a special reason for that decision that is not applicable here, but a scrutiny of the two statutes will disclose that they are not identical, and the decision rests squarely upon the variation. Our statute says: “When a sale of land, as provided in this act, is declared void,” etc., and “in all cases where any such sale (i. e., a sale as provided in this act) has been, or hereinafter shall be, so declared void,” etc. The Minnesota statute reads: “When a sale of lands, as provided in this act, is declared void by judgment of court, the judgment declaring it void shall state for what reason such sale is declared void. In all cases where any sale has been, or hereafter shall be, so declared void,” etc. The learned supreme court of Minnesota say: “The whole argument of appellant in support of his position hinges upon the assumption that the words “so declared void” refer exclusively to sales made subsequent to and under the act, and thereafter declared void, as prescribed in the first clause of the section. We think any such construction of the act is untenable. No possible reason can be suggested why the legislature should leave a class of cases like the present unprovided for.

Similar statutes for the protection of purchasers at tax-sales have been in force for years, broad enough to cover all such cases; and it can hardly be supposed that by re-enacting, in substance, an existing law, the legislature designed to omit from its benefits any such class of cases without any conceivable reason for doing it, * * * But we think the language will not reasonably admit of the construction claimed. The first clause of the