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 back. See Desty, Tax’n, 788, 791, and cases cited; Cooley, Tax’n, 805, and cases cited; Bank v. Americus, 68 Ga. 119; Raisler v. Athens, 66 Ala. 194; Welton v. Merrick Co., (Neb.) 20 N. W. Rep. 111; Railroad Co. v. Dinwiddie, 8 Sawy. 312, 13 Fed. Rep. 789; Peebles v. Pittsburgh, 101 Pa. St. 304. None of the cases cited by the New York court hold differently. The doctrine had already been expressly recognized in New York, (Swift v. City of Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y. 511,) and has since been reaffirmed, (Phelps v. Mayor, etc., 112 N. Y. 216, 19 N. E. Rep. 408.) Neither would it necessarily follow, because an illegal tax that had been paid could be recovered back, that the purchaser of an invalid tax certificate could recover his purchase money. There is a very pronounced distinction between the rights of the party upon whom the tax was assessed, and who has paid the same, and the claim of the tax-title purchaser. Lynde v. Melrose, 10 Allen, 49. In that case the right of a tax-sale purchaser, whose title had been declared void by the judgment of a court, to recover his purchase money, was.denied in the broadest terms. The court says: “No precedent for maintaining such a suit is found, and _ plaintiff's counsel rests his argument solely upon the ground that the defendant has received the amount of the tax without consideration. * * * * * But there is a plain distinction between the right of a person to recover from the town the amount of the tax unlawfully assessed against him and the claim of a purchaser under a collector’s deed, whose title proves defective. The town is not a party to the deed. The purchaser is a mere volunteer in the payment of the tax. He has the same means of knowing whether it is legally assessed that the town has. He buysa title without warranty, except such covenants as he takes from the collector, and he must rest solely upon them. Beyond these covenants his deed is a mere quitclaim, for which he has paid what he thought the chance worth. His speculation may prove profitable or wholly unprofitable, but no one has taken his property without his consent, or with any contract, express or implied, to reimburse him if his bargain prove a losing one.” This case was decided before Chapman v. City of Brooklyn and while it would seem