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 is furnished, and without resort to legal proceedings. The lien is entirely analogous to the liens of mechanics and material-men, and such liens are never extended by the courts beyond the fair and reasonable import of the language used in the statute. Mushlettv. Silverman, 50 N. Y. 360; Hooper v. Flood, 54 Cal. 218; Malter v. Mining Co., (Nev.) 2 Pac. Rep. 50; Gordon Hardware Co. v. San Francisco, etc., R. Co., (Cal.) 22 Pac. Rep. 406; Phil. Mech. Liens, § 428. But the respondent claims in the complaint that the court, if if deems the description in the instrument filed to be defective, should reform such instrument, and “make it conform to the intention of the parties thereto." The power to reform a contract in a case where, by reason of mistake or fraud, it does not embody the true agreement of the parties, certainly exists in courts of equity. But the power relates only to contracts voluntarily entered into; it has no application to cases like the case at bar, where the lien sought to be obtained does not originate in any contract, and may as well be had in cases where there is no contract for a lien as in cases where such contract is made. In this case the lien can only be acquired by complying with the statute, and the right to reform the instrument which is filed cannot be execrisedexercised [sic]. The case of Lindley v. Cross, 99 Amer. Dec. 610, is in point. In the opinion, page 613, the court say: “The lien of the mechanic or material-man is created by statute, and, before either can avail himself of such a lien, the statute must be complied with." And also see Goss v. Strelits, 54 Cal. 640.

Another point, one not suggested by counsel, is equally fatal to the sufficiency of the complaint. The first section of the statute (5490) gives a lien only when the seed is furnished "to be sown or planted upon any lands owned, used, occupied or rented by such person," i. e., the person to whom the seed is furnished. There is no averment in the complaint that the seed was furnished to be sown or planted upon any such land. The statement made in the complaint (paragraph 3) that the seed was sold and delivered to Bradley for the purpose of seeding certain land which Bradley then "spoke of as the land which he had recently purchased from Clayton," comes far short of being an allegation that Bradley at that time owned such land,