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 statute so long as such matter related exclusively to the same subject, or was germane or auxiliary thereto. The provision has been before the court in numberless cases, and while the construction has been uniform, the application has covered so wide a scope of legislation, and subjects so variant, that the cases seem confused and inconsistent, and no great benefit can arise from a citation of authorities., But see, however, as fully sustaining our views in this case, the following authorities: Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 176; People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 635; Davis v. State, 61 Amer. Dec. 331, and note; Fahey v. State, 27 Tex. App. 146, 11 S. W. Rep. 108; O'Leary v. County of Cook, 28 Ill. 538; Allegheny County Home’s Case, 77 Pa. St. 77. It is perfectly clear to us that the statute in question is vulnerable to neither objection urged against it. Relator is therefore remanded to the custody of the respondent, as such sheriff, to be held under the terms of his original commitment. All concur.

, Plaintiff and Respondent, v., Defendant and Appellant.

1. Damage by Fire; Proximate Cause Question for Jury.

In an action for damages caused by a fire which escaped from one of defendant's trains, and ignited upon defendant's right of way, and which spread over adjoining land, and finally destroyed plaintiff's property, held, that whether the fire started by the defendant was the proximate cause of the injury complained of, or whether such injury was the result of another and independantindependent [sic] cause, were, under the evidence, questions of fact for the jury, and the court did not err in submitting such question to the jury, with proper directions as to the law. This is true where the wind shifts or increases in violence after the fire starts, and before the damage is done.

2. Prairie Fire; Evidence of Cause.

Where the undisputed evidence shows that the fire which consumed plaintiff's property started on defendant's right of way, about one rod to leeward of the railroad track, and that such fire sprang up immediately after a train passed the point where the fire originated, and there was no other visible cause for the fire; and no other agency likely to set fires observed in that immediate locality where the fire started, held, that the evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in finding the