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 McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. 8. 340, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Lang v. Wilbraham, 2 Duer, 171; Hosea v. Jacobs, 98 Mass. 65; Lang v. Ropke, 5 Sandf. 363; 4 Kent, Comm. 283, note 1. Said the court in McArthur v. Scott: “By the law of England the question of remoteness depends upon the state of facts at the time of the testator’s death, though differing from that existing at the date of the will” The trust created by this will is perfectly good at common law. The law was finally settled in Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Clark & F. 372. In this case the house of lords decided that the true limitof the rule against pprpetuities was “a life or lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards, without reference to the infancy of any person whatever.” To same effect are Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119; McArthur v. Scott, supra; 1 Jarm. Wills, 508-517; Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 421; Philadelphia v. Girard’s Heirs, 45 Pa, St. 9; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N. W. Rep. 814; Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 536, 25 N. W. Rep. 506; Hale v. Hale, 17 N. E. Rep. 470; Brown v. Brown, (Tenn.) 6 8. W. Rep. 869. The law allows the power of alienation to be suspended beyond this period during the time of gestation in cases of an infant en ventre sa mere. Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Ill. 421; Jarm. Wills, 415-517. And there may be added two periods of gestation. Says Mr. Jarman: “A possible addition of the period of gestation to a life and twenty-one years, occurs in the ordinary case of a devise or bequest to A, (a male) for life, and after his death to such of his children as shall attain the age of twenty-one years, or indeed in the case of a devise or bequest simply to the children of A. (a male) who shall attain majority, though not preceded by a life interest. In either case A. may survive the testator, and leave a wife enciente, and as such child would not acquire a vested interest until his majority, the vesting would be postponed until the period of twenty-one years beyond a life in being, with the addition, it might be, of nine or ten months; and if to either of these hypothetical cases we add the circumstance that A., the parent, were, as of course he might be, an infant en ventre sa mere at the testator’s decease there would be gained a double period for gestation, namely, one at the commencement and an-