Page:North Dakota Law Review Vol. 1 No. 7 (1924).pdf/3

Rh state, he is not thereby estopped from recovering for the conversion thereof against the commission agent who sells it at the terminal market, but such knowledge is a circumstance to be taken into consideration in determining whether he authorized, consented to or ratified the sale thereof; that the measure of damages in such case is the value of the grain at the time and place of conversion, less storage charges to the date thereof, plus freight charges from the local market to the terminal market; and that where recourse has been had against a warehouseman’s bond and a part of an owner’s claim realized therefrom, he can recover in an action against the converter only the excess of his claim over and above the amount realized from the bond. Other questions decided are not here abstracted.

RE: Bryans; A Disbarment Proceeding.

Ten specifications were considered by the referee. Upon three of these the referee submitted findings to the effect that respondent’s conduct was unprofessional. Two of these are approved by the supreme court. It was found that respondent verified a complaint alleging that a certain bank was the assignee of the proceeds of an insurance policy and filed a brief in support of such contention, when he knew as a matter of fact that the bank had no interest in the policy in suit. This is held a violation of the attorney’s duty under Paragraph 3 of Section 794, Compiled Laws 1913. It was further found that he settled a law suit for $4,000.00, and represented to his client that settlement was made for $3,200.00, and paid his client one-half of the sum alleged by him to have been recovered under a contingent fee agreement. Upon this charge he was held guilty of deceit as defined by Section 795, Compiled Laws 1913. The court’s conclusion is expressed as follows:

“We believe if the license to practice be taken away from respondent for a period of time he will come to a fuller realization of what it means to be entrusted with a license to practice the profession of law. The evidence as we view it does not show him so unfit and untrustworthy as to require a judgment of disbarment, and it is not at all likely that he will offend again. If he does, it can be accepted as evidence of his unfitness and disbarment will then follow. Respondent will stand suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law before any of the courts of this state.”

Welch Manufacturing Company, a corporation, vs. Herbst Department Store, a corporation.

In this action on a contract, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and defendant moved in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but granted a new trial, and both parties appealed. Plaintiff objects to consideration of defendant’s appeal. Chapter 335, Laws of 1923, is construed. HELD: That where a motion for a directed verdict has been denied, and the moving party thereafter moves the court in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial, and the court denies the