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 aftermarket constitutes a relevant product market separate from the market for the sale of the product. If a hypothetical monopolist of an aftermarket (that is not a monopolist in the market for the product) could profitably raise prices above the competitive level by at least a small but significant and non-transitory amount, then competition from other aftermarket firms is not sufficient to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the aftermarket. Thus, it is sometimes appropriate to analyze competition in a separate relevant market comprising the aftermarket.

But in many situations, application of general principles of market definition leads to a conclusion that a relevant market is not limited to the product of a single manufacturer, which is consistent with the Supreme Court’s discussion of the issue. Rather, relevant product markets typically include the products of multiple manufacturers. In a broader market, a single manufacturer’s market share may not be sufficient to establish monopoly power in the relevant market.

Anticompetitive conduct by a monopolist can take many forms. Examples of potentially anticompetitive conduct described elsewhere as undermining competition from non-OEMs include refusals to deal, exclusive dealing, exclusionary design, and aggressive assertion of patent rights. Conduct that can harm competition may fit into one or more categories, but the underlying inquiry is whether the conduct harms consumers.

While the Supreme Court recognizes that a monopolist’s refusal to deal with its rivals under narrowly circumscribed circumstances may constitute exclusionary conduct supporting a violation of Section 2, the Court has cautioned against imposing antitrust liability on firms that would require them to do business with other companies, including rivals or potential rivals.