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Rh traditionally laws and the ancient Gods—he is for man, for the living. In all this he is free, fearless, follows his impulse absolutely—and Nietzche calls it his "Selbstigkeit," "unschuldige Selbstigkeit." The word is an unusual one and English writers ordinarily render it "selfishness"—so that Nietzche appears to sanction selfishness and pronounce it innocent from the start. The Germans have, however, a special word for selfishness, which it is noticeable that Nietzche does not use, Selbstsucht, and the connection plainly shows that it is simply an unconditional following of inner impulse against outward pressure, a strong selfhood, which he has in mind: we might say "self-will," if we could rid the word of associations of petty arbitrariness and obstinacy. undefined An analogue to Siegfried may be found in Prometheus, to whom Nietzche elsewhere refers—and with something to the same thought. The glory of Prometheus in his eyes is that he is ready to save the needy race of man even though he goes against the laws and presenting an interesting contrast to the corresponding Semitic one, according to which mere feminine curiosity and weakness brought down Heaven's wrath.

But the strong selfhood, which is an indispensable part of Nietzche's conception of virtue, involves hardness on occasion—one must not be too sensitive to pain, whether one's own or others'. The thinker must be ready to be hard. A part of Nietzche's admiration for Schopenhauer lay in the fact that he was a good and brave fighter; he had had by inheritance and also from his father's example that first essential of the philosopher, firm and rugged masculinity (unbeugsame und rauhe Männlichkeit). Nietsche also appreciates unconventionality—and this too because a strong selfhood is thereby indicated. Our artists, he says,and notably Wagner, live more bravely and honorably than our scholars and professors—even Kant conformed too much.