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Rh some other points in his thinking; in the main, however, he holds to the old theoretic meanings of knowledge and truth, simply urging that it is difficult, if not impossible, to attain knowledge and truth actually.

undefined Nietzsche is skeptical of the objective character of what goes by the name of history—it is more interpretation than fact (Werke, XIII, 64, § 158; XIV, 146, § 303; Philologica, I, 329).

undefined Cf. Beyond Good and Evil, § 12, where the new psychologist, after putting an end to superstition about the soul and falling into a new desert and mistrust, is described as learning at last to invent and, who knows? perhaps to find.

undefined Richter (op. cit., p. 282) refers to a passage (Werke, XV, 1st ed., p. 295), in which Nietzsche speaks of our not receiving, but ourselves positing sense-perceptions. But the perceptions, I take it, are to be distinguished from the stimuli (Reize) that give rise to them—the former we do produce, but the latter we receive. The point with Nietzsche is that our sensations or sense-perceptions are not impressions (hence copies, or at least as much like the original as the image which a die leaves in the wax is to the die)—that we actively create them. See Nietzsche's early discussion of the subject, summarize ante, pp. 50-1; also a late utterance quoted by Meyer (op. cit., p. 589), "In all perception … what essentially happens is an action, still more exactly an imposing of forms (Formen-Aufzwingen): only the superficial speak of 'impressions.'"

undefined Cf., as to deductions from moral needs, reflections on Kant, Will to Power, § 410; on Hegel, ibid., § 416; on philosophers in general, Beyond Good and Evil, § 6; Will to Power, § 412. As to conclusions from needs of happiness, comfort, etc., see Will to Power, §§ 425, 36, 171-2, 455; Beyond Good and Evil, § 210; Genealogy etc., I, § 1; III, § 24. Nietzsche even calls the "desirable" a canon without meaning in relation to the world as a totality (Will to Power, §§ 709, 711). Nor are clearness and irrefutableness really marks or standards of truth. To hold that clearness proves truth is childishness—unclear ideas may be nearer truth (ibid., § 358). As to irrefutableness, see ibid., §§ 535, 541.

undefined In Will to Power, § 598, the idea that there is no truth (called the nihilistic belief) is treated as a recreation for the warrior of knowledge who is ever in struggle with ugly truths—with the implication, then, that after the recreation he will go on with the struggle.

undefined Cf. Will to Power, § 604 (there is no datum, everything being fluid, unseizable, the most permanent thing being our opinions). In one place (Werke, XIII, 49, § 120) he even proposes—following, I imagine, the extreme views of Lange—to do away with the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves (cf. Vaihinger's summary statement of Lange's views, Die Philosophie des Als Ob, pp. 756-7).

undefined Cf. Dorner's happy statement of Nietzsche's view: "In this actual world there are no individuals, no species, and, strictly speaking, also no wills, but only actions and reactions, centers of action and reaction, and the word 'world' signifies only the total aspect of these actions" (op. cit., pp. 137).

undefined See the striking summary paragraph, Will to Power, § 567: Each center of force has its perspective for the rest of the world, i.e., its quite definite valuation and way of acting and resisting. The "apparent world" reduces itself to specific sorts of action proceeding from such centers. The "world" is only a word for the total play of such actions. Reality consists in just this particular sort of action and reaction of each individual to the whole. There hence remains no shadow of right to speak here of appearance. There is no "other," no "true," no essential being—therewith would be designated a world without action and reaction. The contrast between the apparent and the "true" world hence becomes the contrast between "world" and "nothing." Cf. also ibid.,