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484 one of my instincts. Ability to be hostile, hostility—this perhaps presupposes a strong nature, in any case it is conditioned in the make-up of every strong nature. Such a nature needs oppositions, consequently it seeks opposition: aggressive pathos belongs as necessarily to strength as revengefulness and rancor (Rach- und Nachgefühl) to weakness. Woman for example, is revengeful: it goes with her weakness, as does also her sensibility to others' needs.—The strength of the aggressor has a kind of measure in the opposition he needs: all growth shows itself in the seeking out of a powerful opponent—or problem; for a philosopher, who is warlike, challenges also problems to a duel. The task is to overcome, not oppositions in general, but those which require the enlistment of all one's force, suppleness, and mastery in arms—equal opponents. Equality with the enemy—first presupposition of an honest duel. Where one despises, one can not wage war; where one commands, where one sees something beneath one, one has no war to wage.—My war-practice may be summed up in four propositions. First, I attack only those things that are victorious—on occasion I wait till they are victorious. Second, I attack only things against which I should find no allies, where I stand alone—where I compromise myself alone.… I have never taken a step publicly, which did not compromise me: that is my criterion of right acting. Third, I never attack persons,—I use the person only as a strong magnifying-glass, by which to make a general, but elusive and impalpable evil visible. So I attacked David Strauss, more exactly the success of an old man's weak book in the circles of German 'culture'—I thereby caught this culture in the act.… So I attacked Wagner, more exactly the falseness, the mongrel instincts (die Instinkt-Halbschlächtigkeit) of our culture which confuses the super-refined with the opulent, the latest with the great. Fourth, I attack only things where every personal difference is excluded, where there is no background of sorry experiences. On the contrary, attacking is with me a proof of good will, and, on occasion, of gratitude. I honor, I distinguish, when I connect my name with that of a cause, a person: for or against—it is all the same. When I make war on Christianity, this is allowable, because I have had nothing unfortunate and obstructive from that quarter—the most earnest Christians have ever been kindly disposed to me. I myself, an opponent of Christianity de rigueur, am far from charging to the individual what is the fatal result of past ages."

undefined It must be admitted that later on—in his second period—Nietzsche does occasionally use "Selbstsucht" in a eulogistic sense. His attitude then becomes one of sweeping criticism toward his early views, and particularly toward whatever could be regarded as high-flown and extravagant,—and he puts a certain selfishness at the root of all actions. All the same, he admits that there are different kinds and grades of it, and in connection with Siegfried speaks of "der höchsten Selbstsucht" (using "Selbstigkeit" a few lines further on—see Joyful Science, § 99). On the other hand, even "Selbstisch" is used with an unfavorable shade of meaning in Mixed Opinions etc., § 91.

undefined What would be possible if all men's needs were met by the direct bounty of nature (as is sometimes supposed to be the case in tropical regions), or if machinery could take the place of labor, is another question. Nietzsche recognizes the higher uses of machinery, and in general takes a somewhat broader view of the subject later on (see pp. 133, 440).

undefined See J. E. Cabot's A Memoir of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 450. No