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456 social whole as the shepherd does his flock, the state may act to other societies, and even on occasion to its own subjects, as the individual members of a society in their dealings with one another may not. It may kill, rob, subject the unwilling to control, lie, deceive, entrap, without and within (in the latter case, through its courts and executioners, taxation-agencies, compulsory schools, and police)—acts absolutely forbidden to private persons. In a sense it is "immorality organized," which is not, however, a reflection on it as might be imagined, but rather an indication of the limited range of morality. Nietzsche remarks that the study of societies is particularly instructive, as man shows himself more naïve in them—societies always using morality (and by implication, dispensing with it, on occasion] for their own ends (of force, power, order). In other words, politics in essentially Machiavellian—i.e., it has its aim (the good of the social body) and does whatever is necessary to secure it; its rule is expediency entirely, though to know all the depths and refinements of expediency, and to have the courage to act accordingly, may require almost superhuman powers. A statesman, for example, who does not believe in parliaments on principle, may none the less make use of them—he may find them extremely useful, when he wants something upon which he can support himself, on to which he can shift responsibility. The state and the statesman have to reckon with much greater complexes of effects than private morality does, and a world economy is conceivable with such long-range perspectives that all its single requirements would seem for the moment unjust and arbitrary. That a state may do whatever