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Rh states more than one side of a truth at a time, an exception being the classic § 57 of The Antichristian), and yet, if we attend carefully, we can make out a really organic view, at least an approach to one, however unusual in character.

The difficulties arise as we consider what is said, first, of the lower class; second, of the higher classes.

(1) Dr. Dolson thinks that there is with him no suggestion of a social ideal, adding, "the weak can hardly be said to have an end." Professor R. H. Grützmacher, a Leipzig theologian, speaks of his "social, more correctly speaking, unsocial thoughts. One of the best ideas of our day, the social, has not dawned on him." The well-known Königsberg philosopher and theologian, Professor Dorner, finds his conception contradictory in that while on the one hand masters and slaves are determined for one another, on the other they are hostile to one another. So M. Faguet speaks of his creating an "abyss" between the two classes, digging a ditch between them; and Professor Höffding uses the phrase "social dualism," though he admits that Nietzsche ultimately transcended such a view, or rather "took it back." That there is ground for this criticism is indisputable; the only question is, how much ground, and what is the real final conclusion to be drawn?

First, is it true that in Nietzsche's view the weak can hardly be said to have an end—that the master class and great individuals alone have a reason for being? As I read him, this is a fundamental misconception. Great men are the goal, but they can only be reached by a long-continuing social process—one might say world-process—and all the steps and incidents in it acquire significance and justification when taken in connection with the great result. The meaninglessness of things in themselves, i.e., apart from a purpose to which they may be put, was what distressed Nietzsche—a meaningless world was abhorrent to him. Yet disenchanted of the God-idea as he had