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426 making himself master by his intelligence and bringing less intelligent forces under his yoke. For the basis of rank is power, and nothing else; the Rangordnung has fixed itself by the victory of the stronger. In man's body there are ruling forces and others which are subjected and turned into functions—and when mighty individuals appear in society and turn the mass into their instruments, it is something analogous. Behind these natural differences in power it is impossible to go. The only reasonable matter of inquiry is whether at any given time and place actual relations correspond with them. History is a kind of trying out of this question. "Who can command, who must obey—that is there tried out," and Nietzsche adds, "ah, with what long seeking and guessing and failure to guess and learning and re-experimenting!" Society itself is an experiment, and what is sought is those who can command. It is no contract which binds together the commanding and obeying elements, but something more primordial—each side in the end falls into the place belonging to it by nature. Nor is it necessarily harm for men to be subjected—sometimes Nietzsche uses language which suggests quite the reverse. Wherever, he says, there is a spring for many who are thirsty, one heart for many who long, one will for many fitted to be instruments, there a people arises. As stated in an earlier connection, there may be willingness to obey, to be used. Yet the first requirement of social existence is men who can command—who have the right to. "At the summit of states should stand the higher man; all other political forms are attempts to provide a substitute for his self-demonstrating authority." Attempts to provide such substitutes are common today. By adding together a sufficient number of men from the ranks it is thought that the leader or commander may be replaced—this is the origin in Nietzsche's estimation of the various sorts of representative government. But he does not think that arithmetic