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384 Paradoxically enough (and here is a third point of view, one already anticipated), the very restraints of the old régime have prepared for the liberty of the new. The unremitting discipline of the ancient mores has turned men—some men—into beings who can be reckoned on and can reckon on themselves, i.e., are responsible. With this they gain respect for themselves, confidence in themselves. Especially is this the case with those who act as representatives of the group, or who guide it in war or in peace. Yet this respect for themselves and confidence in themselves lead them sooner or later to think that they need not take the law of their conduct from without them, but may give it to themselves. They have learned to act greatly on others' account, they conclude that they might also do so on their own. In short, they become self-acting, self-legislating—that is, persons. The collectivity itself has unwittingly educated them. The altruism bound up with social organization has made this extraordinary, final kind of egoism possible.

And yet the new developments, though less dangerous than they would have been at an earlier time, are not without danger. The individuals strong in themselves and conscious of their strength, may contend with one another and endanger social stability. They may also intoxicate others who are not as strong as they, and make them lose their heads. But gravest of all, they may themselves go to pieces. They are making a new venture, and with all their antecedent training may not succeed. To direct oneself, to take the law of one's conduct into one's own hands, is a perilous thing. Thomas Hill Green said, indeed, "It is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself," and Kant conceived of duty in similar fashion. But both meant little more than that one takes a commonly recognized moral law and re-enacts it in his own person. It is a naïveté, however, to imagine that when a man takes