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Rh as we remember that there are different grades or levels of power to his mind, and above all that he is always thinking of the individual specimen of humanity, the type. The mass, by combining, undoubtedly make themselves stronger than the "strong," but they are none the less poorer, feebler specimens of our kind. undefined

(3) Two or three further instances of Nietzsche's fixing rank according to power may be cited. The morality of men like Heraclitus and Plato is something very different from the morality of subjection such as is practised by the ordinary members of society. It is the morality of those who would naturally have ruled in society, but who in a time of change and dissolution can only rule themselves. The ranking in this case is indeed hardly different from that which most of us would instinctively make. Our ordinary judgments, too, of vanity, hypocrisy, and mere prudence seem to rest on the basis of a standard like Nietzsche's. Why do we look down on a vain person? Because he wants to please, to be what others would like, in this showing a lack of original creative force—he is "empty." We judge an unreal, hypocritical person in the same way—the contemptible thing about him is his exceeding deference to the standards of others. So the typically prudent person is not set on high, because something is lacking in him—the abounding energy that sometimes makes one headlong, frank, defiant to one's cost. On the other hand, love and unselfishness suggest one who overflows in power, and the very counting of costs that ranks low, when it is a dictate of prudence, wins an altogether different estimation when a great love, e.g., love for the community, lies back of it.

Nietzsche appears to have had in mind a systematic classification of men and things according to the following schema: What springs from strength. What springs from weakness. And whence have we sprung? The great choice."