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356 standpoint of his interests, to the prejudice of rarer, higher individuals who more or less stand apart; and if, says Nietzsche, we make this reality over into a morality we have as the result that the average are of more value than the exceptions—something against which he protests with the whole energy of his nature, declaring, "Against formulating reality into a morality I rebel." Hence a remark, which shows again how little nature and natural tendencies are a norm to him: "I find the 'cruelty of nature,' of which so much is said, in another place: she is cruel to her fortunate children (Glückskinder), she spares and protects les humbles."

That Nietzsche's ideal was not one of mere power (of whatever kind), I shall now show by a number of citations—all from the writings of his middle and later period, when the doctrine of the will to power was taking shape in his mind. We still, he says, fall on our knees before force after the old slave-fashion, but if we ask how far force deserves to be revered we can only answer, to the extent reason blends with it—we must ask how far it is ruled by something higher and serves it as its instrument and means. You stronger and haughty minds, he exclaims, grant us only one thing: lay no new burdens on us, but take some of our burdens on yourselves, as becomes the stronger! He indicates plainly enough that tyrants of the ordinary sort are odious to him—whether in the political or intellectual realm. He calls it one of the limitations of great men that they are too apt to make the lesser kind stupid. We may seek to possess things, but not men; authority so as to command others is not desirable. He is against the tyranny of even true opinions—as if they alone should exist! It is the people with "absolute truth" who burn Jews and heretics and good books, and root out entire cultures, as in Peru and Mexico—fanatical love of power leading them on. The same thing