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338 honesty (men being as they are today) that it is the ideal. Especially at the present are differences rife. Even when men agree in calling certain things good, they differ as to which are better and the best—that is, the order of rank (Rangordnung) is different. The very concepts of things—of health, for instance—differ. To a Schopenhauerian or Buddhist, a strong lusty man, eager for life and power, is not in a state of health at all; while from another point of view, it is the Schopenhauerian or Buddhist, craving for the extinguishment of his individuality, who is sick. It is the final ruling impulse in every case that fixes the ideal, and even gives names to things corresponding to its valuations.

The practical conclusion of all this is that in his own case Nietzsche, who most surely has an ideal, does not make any pretensions of absolute rationality about it and does not propose to force it upon any one else, whether by arms or by logic. He simply says to us, "This is my way; what is yours? The way there is not." In other language, "I am a law only for my own kind, I am no law for all." Indeed, having in mind the native differences and inequalities of men, he thinks it no special distinction to have an ideal that everybody shares with us. An ideal is something in which we body forth our very will and personality; how can we expect that all others will have just the same, unless we are like all the rest and have no distinctive being of our own? As we shall see, particular ideals Nietzsche expects will vary more or less among different classes. The ideal that mankind may have in common can only be very general and one that for many will perhaps seem far away.

All the same, ideals may be recommended, and the possibly universal ones to all. While mankind has no generally recognized goal at present, and to go ahead and lay down moral rules as if it had, is unreason and trickery, recommending a