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Rh evil" (here using the latter phrase broadly), or, as he puts it in paradoxical form, "I had to dissolve (aufheben) morality, in order to put my moral will through."

Moreover, criticism had revealed to him the fact of varying types of morality, and the question arose, might there not be still other and perhaps higher types? Of course, this presupposes a generic idea of morality, more or less separable from special instances. Nietzsche does not make a formal definition, but we gather from a variety of direct or incidental references what he thought was involved. In the generic sense, a morality is a set of valuations resting on supposed conditions of existence of some kind. Further, it is something regulating, commanding, so that it introduces order into life: some things may be done, others may not be done—discipline, strictness hence arising. On the subjective side, its root is reverence, the only properly moral motive. As action, it is free (not in the indeterminist sense, but in the sense of voluntary, not forced). Nietzsche sometimes criticises ideals, but when he does so, he has in mind mere abstract desirabilities, fancy pictures unrelated to reality. A morality, as he understands the term, must be a really possible ideal of real beings—something then related to the earth and actual men. Further, although he objects to praising and blaming with their ordinary implications of responsibility and free-will, he none the less recognizes things to honor and things to despise, things to further and things to oppose —so that a basis for moral discriminations