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318 to be revered and the smallest particle of it better than any work of man's; but now, why this extreme respect? Nietzsche sets it down as mere prejudice that truth is of more value than appearance (Schein)—he calls it the worst proven opinion in the world. He even asserts the contrary: "If there is in general anything to worship (anbeten), it is appearance that must be worshiped; it is falsehood and not truth that is divine!" Hence he sees science—so far as this means simply an accurate, painstaking account of the actual—in a new perspective: no longer is it an intrinsic, self-evident good in his eyes. It needs a justification; it gives rise to a problem. This is, of course, from a standpoint beyond science: "the problem of science cannot be recognized (erkannt) on the ground (Boden) of science." Nor can it answer the question it raises. To this end other things must be taken into account; there must be a larger, more ultimate view, a final standard of value—in short, some kind of philosophy, or "faith." Only as we have a supreme value, can we measure the worth of science, of actuality, or of anything else. To attempt, then, to put philosophy "on a strictly scientific basis," as is sometimes proposed, is really to invert the true order of things: it is, as Nietzsche half-humorously remarks, to make not only philosophy, but the truth stand on its head—a violation of all decency for beings (Frauenzimmer) so respectable! Nietzsche thinks that science, however unconsciously to itself, has rested on some kind of faith in the past. Even the ascetic form of science with which we are familiar today has its presupposition ("there is no presuppositionless science"), namely, the idea that getting pure unadulterated facts is greatly important, that truth is more important than anything else—itself a broad, extra-scientific, and most discussable proposition. And when this