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As we have already seen, morality is conceived of by Nietzsche as a law (condition of life) of social groups, and, in the nature of the case, truth, i.e., truthful relations between members of the group, forms a part of it. There is no need to show in detail how habits of deception would prove destructive to the life of the group. But a further step may be taken, and is sometimes taken. Deception or dissimulation may be considered wrong in itself. Moreover, since speaking the truth involves knowing it, this too may be considered obligatory—and obligatory not merely for reasons of social utility, but as an ideal in and for itself. Truth, in both meanings of the term, may come to seem absolute duty—and as matter of fact a fine and exacting conscience in these directions has arisen among civilized peoples.

But Nietzsche asks, Is truth an unconditional obligation? First, is there an absolute obligation to speak or act the truth—never to dissimulate? It is necessary to distinguish between his personal attitude and conduct, and the answer he gives to the theoretic question. He himself was an example of the finest openness —it might have been better for him in certain ways, had he concealed more and said less. He was apt, too, to judge others according to his own standard. For example, the change in his attitude to Wagner was due in no slight degree to the feeling that Wagner was something of an actor. He found Bismarck also guilty of lack of sincerity, though from a different motive (viz., negligence). He remarks that we should today condemn Plato for his sanction of pia fraus, and Kant for deriving his categorical imperative as he did, since