Page:Nietzsche the thinker.djvu/303

Rh for in every exchange not completed at once, the debtor binds himself and is in turn bound; and yet wherever there is a relation of enforced subordination, whether of individuals to other individuals, of individuals to a group, or of impulses to other impulses in the same individual, something similar arises. From the controlling side, it means, "so must you do," from the controlled, "so must I do." At bottom it is a relation of wills, one commanding, the other obeying—for there is no sense in a command, where there is not something to obey. This holds of an individual's inner life as truly as of society: one impulse gets on top, commands, the others have to obey. That regulation of impulses which is implied in morality rests in the last resort on one impulse that has the upper hand. In relation to this dominant impulse, we have to let the question Why? go. Of an ought over and above human relations and human wills, Nietzsche knows nothing. undefined "Ought" is our creation, though it is a necessary one, growing out of the fact that we are at bottom wills—and will must either command or obey. The great man must command, cannot be saved from doing so; and his imperative "thou oughtst" is not derived from the nature of things, but seeing the higher he must put it through, compel obedience to it. There is nothing wrong or unnatural in this—rather may it be as natural for the weaker, the unsteadier, to obey as for the stronger and higher to command; it may be positively easier for the weaker to do this after the first recalcitrancy, may be even a relief [compare, I may say on my own account, the sentiment of Wordsworth's "Ode to Duty"]. undefined That is, two types of individuals may fit organically together in a society—and two kinds of impulses may fit organically together in a single soul. There is thus a strictly natural order of rank in the world (Rangordnung). The order of precedence, the