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286 or that the passionate are unhappy. There are böse men who are happy—a species about whom moralists are silent. Böse impulses become unpleasant when carried to excess or when inhibited by other impulses—they are so far like impulses in general, like pity, for example, which may be felt as miserable weakness, or like thinking, which when unrestrained may become painful. More suffering comes from opinions about the passions than from the passions themselves. Indeed, why it is suffering that must needs follow an evil deed is not clear—why not as well another evil deed? That the evildoer's work is undone sooner or later is equally a doubtful proposition—indeed it is less likely to happen later than earlier, since an order of things may be established on that basis and this be consented to all around. Nietzsche sums the matter up by saying, "That in the consequences of actions reward and punishment are already contained—this thought of an immanent justice is fundamentally false"; and, commenting on the Laws of Manu, he offers interesting suggestions as to the way in which the natural consequences of actions have been turned into rewards and punishments. As for a moral order in the more general sense that the good, kindly, benevolent impulses have a natural sanction, in that they alone contribute to man's advancement and progress, we have already seen Nietzsche contesting such a premise. Evil (böse), unfriendly, destructive impulses are as vital in the total economy of the world as those called good. It is as necessary to be evil to things that cumber the ground as to be good to those that have the promise and power of life.

I pass over briefly Nietzsche's scattering remarks on obligation or "ought"—there is no special treatment of the subject and his view may be anticipated from what has gone before. "Ought" is primarily a phenomenon in contractual relations—